Drodzy Czytelnicy, w wasze ręce oddajemy piętnasty zeszyt Nowego Prometeusza. Jest to zeszyt specjalny, wydany z okazji jubileuszu 30-lecia Studium Europy Wschodniej Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, w ramach serii „30 tomów na 30-lecie SEW UW”. Na niniejszy tom składają się teksty publikowane na łamach Nowego Prometeusza w ciągu 10 lat jego istnienia – 2010-2020.
John Micgiel, Julie George, Yana Gorokhovskaya, Alex Motyl
[discussion originally published in: "Nowy Prometeusz" nr 12, grudzień 2018, ss. 11-35]
The discussion took place on the 30th of June 2018, within the frame of the 15th Annual Warsaw East European Conference 2018 “Independence”, organised by the Centre for East European Studies University of Warsaw. The panel was co-organized by the Harriman Institute, Columbia University. It was moderated by prof. John Micgiel.
[article originally published in: "Nowy Prometeusz" nr 11, czerwiec 2018, ss. 11-22]
As it is known, Wahhabism (al-Wahhabiya) was created in Saudi Arabia by Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab – the Muslim Sunni theologian, who lived in the XVIII century in Saudi Arabia. It became the official ideology of this country. Over the past several decades the main and most important aim for them has been, and still is, to spread their religious ideology as far as it is possible. They have spent more than 89 billion dollars on this over a two decade period of time. In comparison Soviet Russia spent 7 billion dollars on spreading communism during more than 7 decades. Saudi Arabia doesn’t focus only on the countries where all kinds of Islam dominates, but also on the regions where there is political instability and poverty in general. An example is the North Caucasus, where in the early 1990s sheikhs, emissaries and preachers from Arabic countries tried to spread Islam across the whole region taking advantage of its unstable political situation. They wanted to create an Islamic state – an Islamic Caliphate “from sea to sea”.
[article originally published in: "Nowy Prometeusz" nr 11, czerwiec 2018, ss. 63-86]
Georgian emigrants, who in June 1931 began to read the fifteenth edition of the monthly journal “Brdzolis Chma” (Echo of the Battle), the social democrats’ official body, encountered an unclear picture of a young man wearing a white shirt with a tie and a dark jacket on page 4. The photograph was an illustration of a short reminiscence by one of them: And today in front of my eyes stands, as if he were real, a handsome and broad-shouldered Artimon, smiling at me from beneath his manly moustache. As if it was yesterday when I saw him off to the fatherland, walking proudly towards the battlefield. A year has passed – exceptionally hard, full of grief and lament for the Georgian nation.
rozm. Aleksandra Gryźlak
[interview originally published in: "Nowy Prometeusz" nr 10, grudzień 2016, ss. 73-82]
(…) Georgian society is not anti-Russian, but definitely anti-Kremlin. Sentiments against Vladimir Putin and his policies are very strong in Georgia. This was expressed in the recent elections – parties which expressed pro-Russian views and arguments lost, and gained very small numbers of votes. Examples of this trend are parties like, Industry Will Save Georgia or United Democrats. All parties in the new parliament refl ect a very pro-Western vision of the future of Georgia, including the Alliance of Georgian Patriots. The only exception is the one future member elected in constituency representing the Industry Will Save Georgia party. Despite some irritation with the slow process of NATO and EU integration, in all polls, Georgian society continues to express its willingness to join both organizations. Russia failed with its so-called “soft power” in Georgia. The Russia-sponsored think-tanks and media propaganda all failed. Now the Kremlin is conducting more “hard power” projects.
[text originally published in: "Nowy Prometeusz" nr 9, lipiec 2016, ss. 11-22]
The war Russia unleashed against Ukraine in the spring of 2014, which continues to this day, has brought the Donbas in Ukraine to the attention of the entire world. The ongoing war is being fought almost entirely in the Donbas, an industrial centre of coal and steel, and the fortress of allegedly pro-Russian separatists, producing thousands of casualties, both military and civilian. Unlike Crimea, the Donbas, or the Donetsk Basin, has never been a household name in any country outside the former Soviet Union. The fact that little is known about the Donbas and its past makes it difficult for outsiders to comprehend the present situation, let alone to place it within the wider historical context of Ukraine and Russia. To make matters worse, Moscow’s overwhelming propaganda machine has capitalized on this ignorance to distort the historical and political background of the present war in the Donbas.
This essay addresses the issue of the historical identities of the Donbas and seeks to provide a framework to understand the present war in the Donbas.
[text originally published in: "Nowy Prometeusz" nr 9, lipiec 2016, ss. 59-63]
The Russian government does not hide that its main goal is to restore its influence in the former Soviet republics and prevent them from integrating into European structures. In an attempt to achieve this objective, Russia is using all available means, including hard power – the direct military invasions of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) – as well as “soft power”.
In this struggle, information is Russia’s most effective tool. Moscow started the information war against Georgia a long time ago – when Georgia regained independence in 1991. Since then, Moscow has been trying to turn Georgian public opinion in favour of the Kremlin. Putin’s efforts have intensified dramatically during the last few years.
Adam Balcer, Roman Backer, Mikołaj Iwanow, Paweł Kowal, Andrew Nagorski
[niniejszy tekst pierwotnie opublikowany został w: "Nowy Prometeusz" nr 8, październik 2015, ss. 13-34]
Dyskusja odbyła się 12 lipca 2015 roku, na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim, jako część XII dorocznej konferencji Warsaw East European Conference 2015 „Russia and its Neighbors” zorganizowanej przez Studium Europy Wschodniej UW. Dyskusję moderował Adam Balcer.
Justyna Prus, Konrad Zasztowt
[text originally published in: "Nowy Prometeusz" nr 7, kwiecień 2015, ss. 23-37]
On 18 March 2014 Russian Federation annexed Crimea, part of Ukraine, after illegally taking military control of its territory and organising an unrecognized referendum on independence of the region. This article’s goal is to analyse how the annexation and following Russification of the political, social and legal system affected the minority of Crimean Tatars and its relations with Russia. Crimean Tatars, in their majority opposing the annexation and Russian policy, have faced political repressions, civil rights abuses and intimidation.
[text originally published in: "Nowy Prometeusz" nr 7, kwiecień 2015, ss. 41-52]
The development of the Ukrainian political situation continues to raise the question of possible similar scenarios in other post-Soviet countries – mainly Belarus and Russia. How do the recent events in Ukraine affect relations between the authorities and society in those countries? Are the societies of those countries ready for changes? What is the level of public support for the current political regimes and political institutions in those countries and what direction of international integration do the societies in Russia and Belarus support?